Separate out "edit own messages" and "delete own messages" permission in community permission settings

(#3454) Feature Open: Under consideration community moderation

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Comment by @fluxerhost
RexSystem 3 votes originally by @fluxerhost on GitHub OP 1 reply

Example use case for this feature: running fluxer in a corporate setting, or for a law firm.

"Legal discovery" and evidence preservation for all messages must be preserved. If an employee leaves or is fired, they don't get to take their messages with them. If an employee is involved in a corporate investigation (e.g. harassment), the investigations team should be able to extract all messages sent by the user. Message immutability via expanded ACLs is a good first step to support such safety. It is more technically complex, but also a good idea, to preserve all edit and delete history, however it is also a good feature and easy to implement to add message immutability/making the ACLs around messages more granular.
Comment by @fluxerhost
RexSystem 1 vote originally by @fluxerhost on GitHub OP
This particular feature has a few, listed use-cases, most of which seem to be legitimate, but also a lot of ways in which it can be misused...
Again, misuse is in the hands of, and the problem of, the misuser, not the developer, of a technology. Computers should not be banned because people find ways to misuse them.
Create an environment that encourages harassment (the "stand by what you say" idea)
This is a mischaracterization of the proposal and furthermore a social problem, not a technical one. A developer can not control the users of any feature.
Prevent users from burying things, or otherwise leaving them in the past
This is not the problem of the developer of a technology, or the platform itself.
Make it more difficult for users to leave a community, by forcing them to take all or none of their messages with them
I don't see how this is the case. The "leave a community and delete all messages" feature is untouched, as well as the "delete my account and delete all messages/content" feature is also untouched in this proposal.
Admins enable because they, somehow, like it better that way
Is this not within the realm of what makes an administrator of a community, an administrator? It's their community after all.
And, the original concern, of making the platform significantly less usable for a subset of people, still stands.
I don't see how this makes anything less usable.
I don't think any of the provided remediations for these issues are effective.
I don't think those are issues that are the concern of the developer or the platform.
A scare screen would be in opposition to regular use for a channel. Either the scare screen is reduced to the point of ineffectiveness, or it is sufficiently annoying to obstruct general discussion.
Such a screen already exists for NSFW channels. This is not a point.
Given the issue of alarm fatigue, I don't think there can be a good middle-ground in designing a scare screen like this, but there hasn't been any user testing, so that might not be true.
No need to invoke "alarm fatigue" here. This is also a feature request, not a PR, so there is no building of code ahead of time or testing. That is up to the developer/team.
An alternate design might, alongside a scare screen, have a little notice in the bottom right, like the slowmode indicator. If you do want to do user testing, try adding that...!
Thank you for the suggestion. Perhaps the development team can take this into account as an option/possibility.
Edit slowmode either doesn't do anything to stop edit trolling, if you can edit once after sending a message, or, if you can't, obstructs significant real editing usage, like typo corrections and adding context. It also doesn't do anything to solve edit trolling if the slowmode duration is too short, since you can just wait, say, one minute, then edit the message like normal.
Agreed, edit slowmode isn't a good solution to either the symptom ("edit trolling" as mentioned in OP) or the root cause.
Edit windows are probably the best idea here, but there are still valid reasons to edit a message, say, five minutes after it's been sent. It might be a low-traffic channel with long messages, like many of the topic channels in Fluxer Labs, or it might be a living message, pinned or linked to, which would benefit from being updated long after its initial sending.
Perhaps messages in a chat application are being misused as is ("living messages") out of necessity and feature scarcity. Perhaps pinned posts would be able to be edited as another toggle/ACL, only while they are pinned.
Making it exclusive to self-hosted instances has been discussed at length, and I won't bother to repeat it here. Everything that Fluxer (software) can do becomes a part of Fluxer (platform), as soon as federation is involved, so I don't think this is sufficient to stop misuse, and Fluxer Platform AB is at least partially responsible for what features they allow on Fluxer (platform).
"Misuse" of existing features has already been covered, so I won't bother to repeat it here. Misuse is not the problem of the developer of the software.
If Fluxer.com were to choose not to enable this feature, that means there is a significant reason behind the choice, as the default choice is lower-friction, and gives broader access to more features of Fluxer (software). Nobody has posed objections which are not related to safety or data privacy, so it is rather safe to assume that those are the reasons.
No, the objections people have posed "related" to safety or data privacy are, seemingly, grasping for the terms safety or data privacy without substance, as what appears to be a knee-jerk reaction to a feature they don't seem to agree with. Fluxer.com, additionally, could choose to enable or disable any subset of features on its instance for any reason, such as: preference. Not everything declined is dangerous.
Sure, you can choose to leave communities and instances that enable this, but that means you're being excluded from them.
And that's the choice of the user. Nobody is obligated to participate in communities they don't like. Some people don't like bots. Should bots be banned on Fluxer?
It would be best to not hand out access to levers that exclude people. Some people would pull it for fun, others would pull it out of malice, but you know that someone is definitely going to pull it.
Such levers already exist in the software. This is no different.
I also do not accept that the ability to disable message deletion is OK, purely because you can choose to leave a community and delete all of your messages.
You do not have to accept it. Not every feature will be appealing to every user.
That adds a lot of friction to what should be a simple action of deleting a single message, which ultimately requires a choice by the user: assuming they can even rejoin the community, do they value getting rid of that one message more than all of the messages they've sent there? You might be surprised by how little attachment users have to their messages, and I, personally, would probably choose to get rid of everything.
Well, then, okay - feel free to get rid of everything, that's a valid choice.
If anyone chooses to do that, the purpose of the permission has been defeated, and you lost context in previous conversations, and records of real participation in your community.
That is fine, and up to the user, to delete their messages upon leaving a community or deleting their account.
I ultimately believe that these features go against one of Fluxer's goals, to enable easier data privacy for all users.
I ultimately believe that this feature goes for one of Fluxer's goals, and that's to empower its users.
It should be as easy as possible to control exactly what data you have on Fluxer, who can see that data, and what the data they see is.
"should" - perhaps you have feature requests you would like to submit as well? Otherwise, I don't think either of us is the one in charge of determining (or being the final judge of) either the goals of Fluxer or "should"s.
The ability to disable editing or deletion in a channel would, completely unnecessarily, make it more difficult, in service of use-cases that are either already covered by existing solutions, or already obstructed by non-optional features of Fluxer. There is also the potential (the only thing there can be, since the feature doesn't exist yet) for harm, and a significant impact to usability.
I still disagree with the arguments of "potential" and unrealized "harm". It seems like fearmongering against a suggestion that is not desired, for whatever reason.
I have raised the alternative solution, of a Fluxer fork, "Business Fluxer", which adds the feature, and removes support for federation with standard Fluxer, in a way that is not trivially reversible.
This sounds like unnecessary fragmentation and effort for the development team. Also outside the scope of this discussion.
Ideally, it would be maintained by businesses that require it,
No one will, this idea is a non-starter. Also outside the scope of this discussion.
or even officially, by Fluxer Platform AB.
This may be possible, theoretically, but practically, unfortunately not. At least not until many more resources are under the command of Fluxer Platform AB, in my opinion. Unnecessary product segmentation. Also outside the scope of this discussion.
This fork would already be necessary to use Fluxer in a business context, as Fluxer is making a point of having data privacy features, like the ability to delete your account and all messages that it has ever sent, and these features are always enabled, for all users, on all instances.
These features could be placed behind toggles in the admin panel so that a business use case is possible (which is a valid use case for communications software such as Fluxer). That, however, is outside the scope of this discussion around expanded message ACLs, so I will not explore it here.
This would remain true, and unaffected by the presence or absence of editing and deletion permissions, unless Fluxer goes back on this, and makes those features optional, which I believe would significantly ease abuse on a federated network.
Again, abuse is in the hands of and fault of the people taking those actions, not the developers of the tool or platform.
I don't think the good outweighs the bad here, and being reductive about the bad won't help. You do not have my support.
I think the good outweighs the bad, because there is no "bad" to expanding an existing opaque ACL into granular permissions. As for not having your support on this: such is natural. Nobody agrees 100% on every topic. Monocultures die after all. Thank you for your feedback, however.